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DO WE NEED A NEW FOURTH AMENDMENT?
Orin S. Kerr*
PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT. By Christopher Slobogin. Chicago and London: The
University of Chicago Press. 2007. Pp. xi, 306. $37.50.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the year is 2035. The election of Barack Obama in 2008 trig-
gered a quarter century of Democratic Party dominance in American
politics. Over time, Reagan and Bush appointees to the Supreme Court re-
tired and were replaced by much more liberal successors. The new Supreme
Court majority, led by Chief Justice Harold Koh, is now eager to make some
waves. The Justices have set their eyes on the Fourth Amendment: They
want to design a new Fourth Amendment that will match their civil libertar-
ian privacy preferences. They aim to restore what they see as the Court's
rightful place at the center of American privacy law, and they are looking for
a method that combines some traditional principles with a new set of inno-
vations.
In Privacy at Risk, Christopher Slobogin' proposes a new approach to
the Fourth Amendment designed to appeal to such a Court. Slobogin argues
that the government should have to justify all types of surveillance with at
least some sort of cause. In particular, the Constitution should require the
government to justify all investigatory tactics with a sufficient basis to think
the tactic will work in light of its perceived intrusiveness. Slobogin calls this
the proportionality principle: The more the public views a particular tech-
nique as intrusive, the more proof the government must have that the
technique will actually yield evidence in order to justify its use in a particu-
lar case. Privacy at Risk specifically targets two surveillance techniques
currently unregulated by the Fourth Amendment: public surveillance, such
as closed circuit TV ("CCTV"); and transactional surveillance, such as ac-
cess to bank, telephone, and other business records. Slobogin explains that
under his new approach, public and transactional surveillance would be sub-
ject to considerable constitutional regulation. Slobogin then applies his
framework to both techniques and proposes a complex set of Fourth Amend-
ment rules for each.
Should the liberal Supreme Court of 2035 adopt Slobogin's proposal?
And more broadly, does Slobogin's approach offer a conceptual improve-
ment over the Fourth Amendment we have now? In my view, the answer is
* Professor, George Washington University Law School. Thanks to Professor Slobogin and
Jerry Israel for their comments on an earlier draft.
1. Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
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"no." Slobogin provides an interesting thought experiment, but I think his
approach suffers from two significant flaws. First, his method does not accu-
rately weigh the interests it claims to weigh. Although Slobogin presents his
approach as an effort to balance privacy and security interests, neither public
perceptions of intrusiveness nor the likelihood that a tactic will yield evi-
dence accurately measures those interests. As a result, the proportionality
principle that seems unobjectionable in theory turns out to be rather artificial
in application. Second, Slobogin's results could be reached more easily in
other ways. Slobogin's method is surprisingly complicated. In many cases, it
requires courts to master the intricacies of public opinion surveys to deter-
mine public perceptions of intrusiveness. It also requires courts to generate a
complex set of Fourth Amendment rules to govern different surveillance
practices.
For these reasons, Slobogin's book raises interesting questions but fails
to provide useful tools to guide a future rejuvenation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. If a future Supreme Court wants to reconsider privacy rules to extend
protection beyond current law, it can find approaches that are more direct
and less cumbersome than the one Slobogin has offered.
I. A NEW FOURTH AMENDMENT?
A. Overview
Slobogin's book offers a new conceptualization of the Fourth Amend-
ment rooted in what he calls the proportionality principle: An investigative
technique should be permitted under the Constitution only if the strength of
the government's justification for the technique is roughly proportionate to
the level of intrusion it causes (p. 21). Slobogin roots this principle in Terry
v. Ohio2 and its pragmatic balancing of law-enforcement and privacy inter-
ests. To determine how much justification the Fourth Amendment requires,
Slobogin argues, courts should assess the intrusiveness of the investigatory
technique and then set a proportionate threshold of proof that the govern-
ment must show (p. 17). The more intrusive the technique, the higher must
be the degree of ex ante certainty established before the technique can be
used. Moderately intrusive steps might be permitted with a court order
merely establishing relevance, while more intrusive steps might be allowed
only with probable cause. This case-by-case balancing of interests should
replace the bifurcated design of existing Fourth Amendment law that leaves
some practices entirely unregulated by the Fourth Amendment and then re-
quires warrants based on probable cause for others (pp. 205-14).
The notion of intrusiveness is central to Slobogin's proposed reworking
of the Fourth Amendment. Slobogin does not define the term, but he argues
that intrusiveness should be based heavily on public opinion: Courts should
measure intrusiveness based on what the citizenry believes is intrusive (pp.
32-33). Slobogin then suggests two ways for courts to assess societal
2. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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attitudes toward intrusiveness. First, courts should look to positive law such
as property, contract, and tort doctrine for "clues as to what we think is pri-
vate" (p. 33). When "positive law is ambiguous or does not [directly]
address a particular situation," courts should next turn to surveys and public
opinion surveys (p. 33). If public opinion surveys reveal that the public sees
a technique as intrusive, then courts should require the government to estab-
lish ex ante a high degree of probability (such as probable cause) before
permitting investigators to conduct that step.3 In some cases the government
would need a court order from a judge; in other cases the government would
need the appropriate cause but no court order would be required.
Slobogin's reconceptualization would also restructure Fourth Amend-
ment remedies. Slobogin falls short of flatly rejecting the exclusionary rule,
but he argues that a system of civil damages should become the leading
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations (p. 216). Because the exclusion-
ary rule ensures that Fourth Amendment issues arise with mostly guilty
defendants, judges are more likely to construe the Fourth Amendment nar-
rowly to keep guilty defendants in jail. In contrast, a strong system of civil
damages would encourage judges to construe the Fourth Amendment in an
appropriately broad way that reflects the real societal costs of pro-
government rulings (p. 215). Slobogin suggests a range of reforms to en-
courage Fourth Amendment civil suits, including liquidated damages, rules
against indemnification for reckless violations, and free lawyers for plain-
tiffs (p. 215).
With this conceptual framework in place, Slobogin applies it to two
types of surveillance to build the case for greater legal regulation of those
practices. He first considers public surveillance and, in particular, the use of
CCTV cameras in public areas. He then considers transactional surveillance
such as government access to account records for telephones, banks, and
credit cards.
B. Public Surveillance
Existing law offers few if any restrictions on public surveillance such as
CCTV. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to surveillance in public, and
legislatures have not enacted any meaningful regulation of such surveillance
(pp. 89-90). This is misguided, Slobogin contends. Courts should recognize
a constitutional right to public anonymity because lack of public anonymity
"promotes conformity and an oppressive society" (p. 92). Governmental
power to watch us in public can chill our speech, discourage our free spirit-
edness, and infringe upon our capacity for self-definition (pp. 90-108).
Slobogin then applies his proposed framework to make the case for sig-
nificant Fourth Amendment regulation of public surveillance. He first looks
to positive law to establish the intrusiveness of public surveillance in general
and CCTV in particular. Slobogin concludes that the absence of existing legal
regulation "probably says little" about public assessments of intrusiveness
3. See pp. 34-35.
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(p. 109). The difficulty is that "[n]o entity other than the government en-
gages in concerted, overt surveillance of the public streets using cameras"
(p. 109). The lack of legal regulation probably just reflects the fact that such
surveillance is rare and has not triggered public outcry. As a result, positive
law cannot provide a source for measuring the intrusiveness of public sur-
veillance.
Slobogin next reports on public assessments of intrusiveness by present-
ing results of a survey he conducted for his book. In the survey, 190 people
called for jury duty in Gainesville, Florida were asked to imagine that the
government was conducting an investigation of a person who was actually
innocent. They were then asked to rate the intrusiveness of a range of differ-
ent types of investigative techniques used to investigate that innocent person
and rank the intrusiveness on a scale from 1 (least intrusive) to 100 (most
intrusive) (p. 111). Slobogin took twenty of the twenty-five most relevant
scenarios and ranked the different techniques based on their average intru-
siveness as reported by the survey participants.
Here is the average intrusiveness of the different techniques, ranked




1. Looking in foliage in park 8 +/-4
2. Conducting health and safety inspection of factory 14+/-4
3. Monitoring cameras at national monuments 20 +/-7
4. Monitoring cameras at government buildings, airports, train stations 20 +/-7
5. Inspecting a coal mine 25+/-5
6. Monitoring cameras at stores 26 +/-8
7. Stopping drivers at roadblock for fifteen seconds 35 +/-5
8. Monitoring covert street cameras that have zoom capacity 42 +/-9
9. Flying helicopter 400 feet over backyard 50 +/-5
10. Conspicuously following person down street 50+/-5
11. Going through garbage cans at curbside 51 +/-5
12. Searching a junkyard 51 +/-5
13. Monitoring overt street cameras; tapes destroyed after ninety-six 53+/-8
hours
14. Monitoring a beeper on a car for three days 63 +/-5
15. Using a device that can see through clothing to detect outline of 67 +/-5
items
16. Conducting a pat down of outer clothing; feeling for weapons 68 +/-5
17. Using a video camera to overhear a conversation on the street 70 +/-5
18. Same as 13 above, but tapes not destroyed 73 +/-8
19. Searching body cavities at border 75 +/-5
20. Searching a bedroom 76 +/-5
[Vol. 107:951
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Slobogin concludes from the survey that CCTV should be subject to
some kind of Fourth Amendment regulation (pp. 112-13). He reasons that
some kinds of public surveillance by cameras registered a higher level of
intrusiveness than some techniques that the Fourth Amendment already
regulates (pp. 112-13). For example, the Fourth Amendment regulates
health and safety inspections at a factory, which measured an average intru-
siveness of only fourteen, and inspections at a coal mine, which averaged a
rating of twenty-five (p. 112). CCTV was often seen as much more intru-
sive: Street cameras where the tapes are retained measured an average
intrusiveness of seventy-three. Because survey results show that public sur-
veillance is often perceived as quite intrusive, the Fourth Amendment should
protect against its use.
Slobogin then proposes a range of requirements that the Fourth Amend-
ment should impose on CCTV, some of which resemble standards offered
by an American Bar Association report for which he served as the reporter.4
First, government agencies that want to use CCTV cameras must justify the
installation of each individual camera (pp. 120-21). Slobogin looks to the
Supreme Court's roadblock cases and finds the analogy between roadblocks
and CCTV cameras persuasive; as a result, he suggests, public cameras
should be authorized only when roadblocks would be authorized (pp. 120-
21). In his view, this means that cameras should be allowed only when there
is individualized suspicion, other techniques pose a formidable law-
enforcement problem, an immediate hazard to life and limb is present, or
else there is a need to obtain information about a serious crime (pp. 120-
21).
Slobogin next argues that the Fourth Amendment should impose strict
requirements on how government agencies use public-surveillance cameras.
Once a camera has been installed, individualized suspicion should be re-
quired before a camera is focused on an individual in a way that involves
"intense scrutiny" (p. 125). All individuals surveilled should receive notice
of the monitoring (pp. 126-27). Surveillance should be terminated when no
longer needed: Suspicionless surveillance should be terminated after one
minute if no cause develops, and if continued beyond a minute, it should be
terminated after five to ten minutes unless probable cause develops or ex-
tenuating circumstances exist (p. 128). Agencies should be required to
disclose their practices to facilitate oversight (pp. 132-33), and there must
be penalties, such as suspension or a dock in pay for employees or injunc-
tive relief, for noncompliance (pp. 133-34).
C. Transactional Surveillance
Transactional surveillance receives similar treatment. Once again, the
positive law regulating transactional surveillance is very modest. Fourth
4. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ELEC-




Amendment protection is nonexistent, and statutory standards remain low.
Slobogin contends that this is a mistake: Third party records can have enor-
mous privacy implications and deserve much higher privacy protection than
they currently receive (pp. 139-80).
Slobogin then offers an empirical study to bolster the case for greater
transactional surveillance (p. 183). Seventy-six participants received written
descriptions of twenty-five scenarios involving different investigative tech-
niques, and they were asked to rate the intrusiveness of the techniques on a
scale from 1 to 100. Slobogin then ranked the average intrusiveness of the
techniques as follows, with the following confidence intervals (p. 184):
FIGURE 2
TRANSACTIONAL SURVEILLANCE
1. Roadblock 30.2 +/-7.5
2. Airplane passenger lists (data mining) 32.4 +/-8
3. Store patron lists (data mining) 34.1 +/-7.5
4. Criminal/traffic records 36.2 +/-7
5. Anonymous phone, credit card, and travel records (data mining) 38.5 +/-7
6. Corporate records 40.6 +/-7
7. Real estate records 45.5 +/-8
8. ID check and questioning during brief stop 49.1 +/-8
9. Club membership records 49.5 +-8
10. Phone records (data mining) 50.0 +-8
11. Electricity records 57.5 +/-8
12. High school records 58.3 +/-9
13. Phone, credit card, and travel records (data mining) 59.7 +/-8
14. Record of specific phone call 59.8 +-7.5
15. List of food purchases 65.3 +-7.5
16. Pat down 711.5 +-7.5
17. Phone records 74.1 +/-7.5
18. Web sites visited 74.4 +/-8
19. Search of car 74.6 +/-7
20. Credit card records 75.3 +-7.5
21. E-mail addresses sent to and received from 77.1 +/-8
22. Pharmacy records 78.0 +/-7.5
23. Use of snoopware to target subject 79.0 +/-8
24. Bank records 80.3 +-7.5
25. Bedroom search 811.2 +-6.5
Slobogin concludes from the survey that transactional surveillance
should be subject to Fourth Amendment regulation. Many of the respon-
dents viewed transactional surveillance as more intrusive than roadblocks,
patdowns, and searches of cars, all of which are currently regulated by the
Fourth Amendment (pp. 183-84). Fourth Amendment law should recognize
[Vol. 107:951
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these societal attitudes and should regulate transactional surveillance as well
(p. 185).
Slobogin then uses the empirical study to generate a framework to gov-
ern transactional surveillance under the Fourth Amendment. Slobogin's
approach distinguishes between two types of surveillance-target-driven
surveillance and event-driven surveillance-and among four types of re-
cords-corporate records, public records about individuals such as real
estate records, quasi-private records such as utility records, and fully private
records such as medical records (p. 183-86). He would then recognize four
distinct thresholds the government could use to compel transactional infor-
mation: subpoenas based on relevance, court orders based on relevance,
court orders based on reasonable suspicion (what he describes as Terry or-
ders), and warrants based on probable cause (pp. 185-86).
Slobogin then argues that the different types of orders to compel should
be constitutionally mandated for different types of records as follows:5
FIGURE 3
SLOBOGIN'S TRANSACTIONAL SURVEILLANCE PROPOSAL
AUTHORIZATION
TRANSACTION REQUIRED THRESHOLD
Corporate records Subpoena Relevance
Public records about individuals Court order Relevance
Quasi-private records obtained through Court order Relevance
event-driven surveillance
Quasi-private records obtained through Terryorder Reasonable suspicion
target-driven surveillance
Private records obtained through Terry order Reasonable suspicion
event-driven surveillance
Private records obtained through Warrant Probable cause
target-driven surveillance
In Slobogin's view, these thresholds reflect the proper balance of the intru-
siveness of different techniques and the government interest in using them.
II. A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE
Let's go back to the future-specifically, to the hypothetical of the lib-
eral Supreme Court in 2035 that opened this Review. Does Slobogin's
framework offer the best path for the hypothetical Supreme Court of 2035 to
follow? I think the answer is "no" for two primary reasons. First, Slobogin's
approach lacks a strong conceptual grounding: It fights against, rather than
follows from, a balancing of privacy and security interests. Few would deny
5. P. 186. Unfortunately, a typographical error in the book has led to the authorization re-
quired for private records appearing incorrectly in the summary chart on page 186. I have used a
corrected version here.
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the need to balance privacy interests and security interests in Fourth
Amendment law. But Slobogin's version of the balance proves unsatisfying
because the two sides of the equation don't measure the interests accurately.
"Intrusiveness" provides a weak proxy for privacy interests, and ex ante cer-
tainty in court orders provides a poor proxy for security interests.
Second, there are much simpler ways to reach Slobogin's results.
Slobogin candidly acknowledges that his framework was drafted with par-
ticular results in mind. Slobogin aims to increase privacy protections in the• 6
areas of physical and transactional surveillance, and he is less concerned
with how we get there than that we do in fact get there.7 But Slobogin's ap-
proach is significantly more complicated than it needs to be. Existing law
could be tweaked to achieve Slobogin's desired results without requiring
such a dramatic reconceptualization of the Fourth Amendment.
A. A Lack of Balance
1. What Does "Intrusiveness" Measure?
Let's start with the notion of intrusiveness, which in many ways forms
the heart of Slobogin's approach. Slobogin uses public perceptions of the
relative intrusiveness of a technique used against an innocent to measure the
technique's threat against privacy interests. The more the public views a
technique as intrusive, the greater the privacy interests it implicates. But in
my view, this framework is incorrect: Public perceptions of intrusiveness
when a technique is used against an innocent person bear only a slight con-
nection to the real civil liberties interests raised by a particular law-
enforcement technique.
To see why, think carefully about the word "intrusive." The word intru-
sive suggests interference with the status quo. The more intrusive something
is, the more it alters the world that existed before. As a result, police tech-
niques that are common, are expected, or go unnoticed will tend to seem
unintrusive. They don't change the status quo very much, if at all. On the
other hand, police techniques that are uncommon, unexpected, or high-
profile will tend to be seen as intrusive. In a sense, intrusiveness measures
surprise: The more surprising a technique is, the more it jolts the status quo,
the more it will upset expectations, and the more intrusive it will appear.
In my view, this understanding of intrusiveness explains the results of
Slobogin's public opinion surveys. Consider Figure 1, the chart of survey
responses involving physical surveillance and video cameras. At the top of
the chart, the six least-intrusive scenarios (numbers 1-6) all involve surveil-
lance that is expected and common. We expect safety inspectors to check
6. P. 5 ("The principal thesis of this book is that ... physical and transaction surveillance
techniques must be regulated more extensively than they currently are.").
7. For example, in response to an argument I have made that rule making in this area is best
left to Congress rather than courts, Slobogin suggests that congressional rather than constitutional
rule making may be acceptable to him if privacy protections are very strong. He writes, "The goal
should be meaningful protection of personal information, whatever its source." P. 203.
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out factories, we expect stores to have cameras to watch for shoplifting, and
we expect the government to have cameras at national monuments. This sort
of surveillance is part of our everyday experience. As a result, survey re-
spondents rank it low on the intrusiveness scale.
Moving down the list brings us to techniques that are more uncommon,
unexpected, and visible. The techniques in the middle of the chart (numbers
7-13) are generally used at an early stage of an investigation. For example,
conspicuously following a person down a street suggests that the govern-
ment is watching but that it doesn't yet have enough evidence to know
exactly what the suspect has done. At the same time, such techniques tend to
cast a wide net and don't suggest that the government already believes that
the innocent person is guilty. The methods are part of the backdrop of
criminal investigations but not part of daily experience. Survey respondents
accordingly describe them as moderately intrusive.
The bottom of Figure 1 lists the methods ranked the most intrusive. For
the most part, these are techniques that the government uses only after sin-
gling out a criminal suspect. For example, everyone knows that the
government doesn't search bedrooms of just anyone. Such searches require
great effort and target specific individuals rather than large groups. If we
posit that the government's target is innocent, as Slobogin required survey
respondents to assume, the techniques listed at the bottom of the chart logi-
cally become the most intrusive. After all, it is a shocking thing-and we
can hope, an uncommon one-for the government to treat an innocent per-
son as a criminal. The same dynamic explains Figure 2, the chart on
transactional surveillance: The more unexpected and uncommon the surveil-
lance for an innocent target and the more it wrongly suggests guilt, the more
intrusive it becomes to survey respondents.
If I am right about how members of the public gauge intrusiveness, then
Slobogin's methodology suffers from an important weakness: Measuring
intrusiveness does not actually measure how much a technique infringes on
civil liberties. Indeed, whether an investigative technique seems jarring, un-
common, or becomes associated with guilt in the public mind has no
obvious connection to the civil liberties threats its use will raise. In general,
a technique will threaten civil liberties when it is used in an abusive way by
investigators. It might be used in bad faith, such as to monitor political ene-
mies rather than actual crime. Or it might be used when its costs to civil
liberties outweigh its benefit to public safety, such as if the police use highly
invasive techniques to solve very minor crimes. But these possibilities are
only loosely correlated with whether the public sees the technique as jarring.
This is true for three reasons. First, the frequency of a technique simply
has no necessary correlation with its threat to civil liberties. Some tech-
niques are uncommon but raise few civil liberties concerns, while others are
used widely but are quite troubling to civil liberties. For example, I think
roadblocks raise a serious threat to civil liberties: They permit the govern-
ment to stop travelers and subject travelers to government inspection
without any individualized suspicion. Even if they are relatively common,
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and do not suggest the guilt of the person stopped, roadblocks nonetheless
impose a serious infringement on personal liberty.
Second, public perceptions can be erroneous. Under Slobogin's ap-
proach, public perceptions must become enshrined as constitutional law
whether they are accurate or not. If the public were to misunderstand the
real privacy implications of new technologies, then that's too bad: Their per-
ceptions trump. Even assuming that intrusiveness measures civil liberties
interests, Slobogin's approach requires the actual threat of a particular tech-
nique to civil liberties to play second fiddle to the public's perception of the
threat.
Misunderstandings are particularly likely in the case of technological
surveillance like CCTV and transactional surveillance. Most people experi-
ence technological surveillance in two settings: first, routine commercial
settings that they experience firsthand, and second, nonroutine settings of
criminal and terrorism investigations that people read about in news reports.
Slobogin's surveys suggest that most people are quite comfortable with the
former. People often don't fear what they have experienced firsthand and
found harmless. But many people are scared of what they don't understand,
and many will find reports of new forms of technological surveillance quite
unnerving. Media coverage no doubt fuels this perception. Journalists tend
to report every technological surveillance story as the arrival of Big Brother,
even if that angle is comically incorrect.8 As a result, public perceptions of
new technological surveillance can be highly inaccurate.
Third, the civil liberties threat raised by a particular technique is a func-
tion of its average intrusiveness, which itself is a byproduct of the kinds of
cases in which it is used. A technique used exclusively to target the guilty
would be much less intrusive than one often used to target the innocent. As a
result, any assessment of the civil liberties threat posed by a particular inves-
tigative technique must account for the settings in which the police employ
the technique. However, Slobogin's study avoids this: It measures the intru-
siveness of techniques only in the hypothetical case of an innocent suspect,
avoiding the contextual inquiry into average intrusiveness. For all of these
reasons, Slobogin's effort to measure intrusiveness fails to provide a proxy
for the civil liberties that he is attempting to measure.
Unfortunately, Slobogin's response to these methodological concerns is
only hinted at in the book.9 The defense rests largely on the requirements of
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. First, the Supreme Court has men-
tioned the role of "understandings that are recognized and permitted by
8. A helpful example is the FBI surveillance tool popularly known as Carnivore, which the
FBI created to protect privacy when it had obtained court orders from federal judges authorizing
surveillance. Of course, the press didn't report it that way. See Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh
Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1106113372.shtml (Jan. 18, 2005, 23:49 EST).
9. Slobogin's perspective on the methodological issues receives fuller treatment in his 1993
article with Joseph Schumacher that introduced his methodology. See Christopher Slobogin & Jo-
seph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment
Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society", 42 DuKE
L.J. 727, 743-51 (1993).
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society" when applying the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test.' ° Ac-
cording to Slobogin, this reference requires a study of what society
understands as intrusive." Second, the Supreme Court has suggested that the
test for when a person is seized-when a reasonable person in the suspect's
position would not feel free to terminate an encounter with the police-
should be measured from the perspective of an innocent suspect rather than
a guilty one. 2 According to Slobogin, this means that the Fourth Amend-
ment is properly viewed from the perspective of innocent persons rather
than guilty ones."
I find Slobogin's justification unpersuasive. The first problem is that his
proposal itself advocates a dramatic revision of current doctrine. It is diffi-
cult to justify a revision of current doctrine on the ground that some aspects
of current doctrine require it. Either existing Supreme Court doctrine is
binding authority or it is not. And if it is helpful authority in some instances
but not others, then some theory is needed to account for when it is helpful.
If existing doctrine can impose requirements, why doesn't it also forbid the
revision? Given the policy-driven nature of Slobogin's proposal, reliance on
snippets of existing law to justify a particular approach to reform seems no-
tably out of place.
The second problem is that Slobogin appears to use that existing law out
of context. While the Supreme Court has mentioned "understandings that
are recognized and permitted by society," it has done so only in the course
of determining what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.' 4 Under
Slobogin's method, however, essentially everything is a search; the real
question becomes how serious a search it is, and thus whether it counts as
constitutionally reasonable or unreasonable. Similarly, the Supreme Court
has applied the perspective of an innocent suspect only in the course of de-
termining when a person is seized. The difference is very important in that
setting, as an innocent person is much less likely than a guilty person to feel
like a target of police arrest. But why should the distinction carry over to the
very different question of whether a Fourth Amendment search is constitu-
tionally reasonable? If the doctrine is to jump from one box to the other,
some theory (or at least some argument) is needed to explain why.
10. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978).
11. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 9, at 743-51.
12. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991).
13. See p. 111 ("[The assumption that the target is innocent] is consistent with the Supreme
Court's definition of search and seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes." (citing Bostick, 501 U.S.
at 438)).
14. To be clear, I think the Court's doctrine generally does not rely directly on societal stan-
dards in applying the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. As I have detailed elsewhere, the
Court's applications generally rely on normative assessments of the costs and benefits of subjecting
a legal technique to constitutional regulation. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REv. 503 (2007).
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2. What Do Certainty Thresholds Measure?
I have similar difficulties with Slobogin's assessment of government in-
terests. In my view, Slobogin's approach does not accurately measure what
it purports to measure. Recall that Slobogin argues that the government must
justify invasions of autonomy and privacy interests by showing a competing
interest in solving crime. Under his approach, the government's interest is
established by ex ante evidence that the technique will be successful and
evidence will be found. A greater invasion of privacy must be justified by a
greater showing of evidence: Highly invasive techniques must be justified
by probable cause, less invasive techniques by reasonable suspicion, and the
least invasive techniques by mere relevance to an investigation (pp. 37-44).
The government's degree of certainty serves as a proxy for the degree of the
government's interest.
This approach doesn't work because the government's amount of proof
that a technique will yield evidence ex ante fails to correlate well with the
degree to which the technique furthers government interests. To see why,
consider the government's interests in a criminal investigation. The goal of
the criminal justice system is to further the retributive and utilitarian ends of
the criminal law." By gathering evidence and catching the bad guy, the gov-
ernment can impose punishment that deters future wrongdoing and furthers
the ends of justice. As a result, the proper measure of how much an investi-
gative method furthers the government's interests is how much the technique
helps the government catch and successfully prosecute bad guys in light of
how much that successful prosecution deters future wrongdoing, incapaci-
tates wrongdoers, and furthers justice.
The amount of proof the government has ex ante reveals only a very
small part of this picture. First, the government's degree of certainty ex ante
is different from the likelihood of finding evidence ex post. For example,
studies have indicated that the level of certainty required to obtain a search
warrant is different from the likelihood that warrants actually recover evi-
dence.16 The gap between ex ante probability and ex post results suggests
that we cannot rely on ex ante thresholds without some sense of how they
actually translate to likelihood of finding evidence. As far as I know, how-
ever, no studies have explored this dynamic outside the warrant context.
Second, the degree of confidence that some evidence will be found sheds
little light on how much will be found or how helpful the evidence will be.
Consider a simple example. A police officer may be highly confident that a
particular search will uncover marginally relevant evidence in a very minor
case. Maybe the officer knows of a 99 percent chance that a search of a tar-
get's home will discover evidence (bolstering an already strong case) that
the defendant drove his car slightly over the speed limit. Next, imagine the
15. See generally HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 35-61
(1968).
16. See RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS 120 tbl.6-2 (1983)
(reporting that, in the seven jurisdictions studied, the police seized most or all of the items listed in a
warrant 64 to 82% of the time for executed and returned warrants).
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officer has only a slight reason to think that another particular search will
uncover critical evidence that will prove a case of profound importance.
Maybe the officer has learned of a 10 percent chance that searching the tar-
get's home will uncover a signed and notarized confession to a string of
planned terrorist attacks.
In the example, the search for evidence of speeding will almost certainly
lead to evidence. At the same time, a 10 percent chance of cracking a major
terrorism case serves the public interest in security vastly more than a near
certainty of gaining marginally relevant evidence of speeding. The lesson is
that the degree of certainty that a technique will yield evidence and the de-
gree to which the technique will advance government interests will often
diverge. The government's interest cannot be measured solely by the
chances that some evidence will be discovered; any measurement must con-
sider the importance of the case and how much the evidence will advance
that case in light of the alternatives.
A recurrent theme of my critique is that a true balancing of interests re-
quires context. To know the costs and benefits of using an investigative
method, we need to know the overall threat to civil liberties and how much
the technique's use will advance government interests in the contexts in
which the technique will actually be used. Slobogin's approach tends to strip
the techniques of their relevant context. The approach generally does not
factor in how much the surveillance solves crime, the seriousness of the
crimes that it solves, how much it succeeds compared to alternatives, and
how often it targets guilty suspects instead of innocent ones.17 In my view, a
genuine proportionality principle must take these factors into account.
The difference has particular relevance in cases of public and transac-
tional surveillance. A pragmatist Supreme Court Justice trying to balance
privacy and security interests in the setting of public and transactional sur-
veillance would need to consider how these techniques are used, how often
they are abused, and what alternative legal regimes such as statutory protec-
tions might regulate them absent constitutional protection. That pragmatic
Justice would need to consider the administrability of Fourth Amendment
rules in areas of technological change and the usefulness of public and
transactional surveillance in advancing government mvestgations. Existing
doctrine leaves room for such decisions, as I have argued in several recent
17. Professor Slobogin briefly suggests that the seriousness of the crime under investigation
may be relevant in some cases. In particular, he offers a "danger exception" to the proportionality
exception: A public safety risk that is "significant" and "imminent" may lower the thresholds at
which action should be permissible. See p. 28. However, Professor Slobogin does not develop the
point except to say that the border of the exception must be "strictly drawn" to avoid gutting the
proportionality principle. P. 28.
18. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REv. 561 (2009)
(arguing that transactional surveillance should not be subject to Fourth Amendment oversight for
these reasons).
19. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 857-82 (2004).
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articles. 20 As a result, existing law sometimes leads the courts to conclude
that surveillance steps should not be regulated at all under the Fourth
Amendment.
Slobogin's approach largely eliminates this option. It ordinarily takes
away the category of surveillance permitted without justification, and it
avoids looking at the costs and benefits of different rules governing surveil-
lance techniques in the actual contexts in which they are used. While his
approach would move the law in a civil libertarian direction, subjecting all
surveillance to judicial oversight, it would result in a less accurate balancing
of Fourth Amendment interests than current law.
B. An Easier Way?
Slobogin's approach also appears unnecessarily complicated. A Supreme
Court eager to achieve Slobogin's results could do so more easily with much
less doctrinal reform. The complexity results largely from reliance on public
opinion surveys. If the Supreme Court must rest constitutional rules on pub-
lic perceptions of invasiveness, public opinion surveys used to measure
those perceptions must be robust. Survey responses can be highly sensitive
to the audience, to the phrasing of the question, and to the timing of the sur-
vey.2' Results of a survey taken one day, with one audience, with questions
phrased in a particular way may not match results from another day, another
audience, and another set of questions. Before creating a constitutional rule
based on public opinion, the Justices must assure themselves that the known
surveys accurately and permanently reflect public opinion.
As a result, Slobogin's method requires judges to become skilled at
reading surveys, and knowing when public opinion has been accurately
measured and for how long that measurement will remain valid. But can
judges do this? Consider Slobogin's survey of transactional surveillance (pp.
183-86). We know that Slobogin surveyed seventy-six people and asked
them to rank twenty-five scenarios in order of intrusiveness (pp. 183-86).
However, we do not know who the seventy-six people were or how they
were chosen. Nor do we know the actual scenarios provided to them: Slobo-
gin summarizes the scenarios but does not include the actual language that
the survey respondents were asked to consider (pp. 183-86).
Now imagine that the Supreme Court has decided to adopt Slobogin's
approach in a case involving transactional surveillance. Can the Court rely
on Slobogin's charts? Is a survey taken by seventy-six people enough? What
if the people Slobogin queried have unrepresentative views? What if public
opinion varies by state or region or age or race? Can the Court create a con-
stitutional rule based on survey results without even knowing the actual
questions asked? And what if public opinion changes over time-should the
courts change the rule when public opinion changes, such as after a terrorist
20. See Kerr, supra note 18; Kerr, supra note 19; Kerr, supra note 8.
21. See generally Josine Junger-Tas & Ineke Haen Marshall, The Self-Report Methodology in
Crime Research, 25 CRIME & JUST. 291 (1999).
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attack or the release of an influential movie about surveillance? How would
judges know when public opinion has changed? And how should courts rec-
oncile dueling surveys? If the constitutional result depends on survey
results, can the government simply conduct a new survey, rely on the results,
and then insist on new constitutional rules? Slobogin's method requires
courts to have answers to all of these questions.
Even if courts can answer such questions, there are much easier ways to
reach similar results. The Supreme Court of New Jersey's approach to trans-
actional surveillance offers a helpful illustration: That court has regulated
transactional surveillance under the New Jersey Constitution in ways that
provide results similar to what Slobogin wants without reliance on public
opinion surveys. If the U.S. Supreme Court wants to adopt Slobogin's re-
sults, the New Jersey Supreme Court's example would provide a simpler
and more direct approach than Slobogin's own.
The New Jersey court regulates transactional surveillance by making
two basic moves. First, the court rules that the practice falls under the state
constitution. Thus, the New Jersey court has held that government access to
bank records,22 phone records,23 and Internet Service Provider records of IP
24addresses are protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy under New
Jersey's version of the Fourth Amendment. This step is straightforward, as it
largely tracks the dissents in analogous U.S. Supreme Court cases." The
second step is more creative. The court applies a balancing test that consid-
ers "the type of protection" 26 that should be afforded "in the face of
legitimate investigative needs ' 27 that "will arise [and] justify State intrusion
upon that interest.' 2 The inquiry is expressly normative, weighing the public
interest in investigative needs against the public interest in privacy in light of
then-existing technology. Using this approach, the New Jersey Supreme
Court has held that the New Jersey Constitution requires state investigators
to obtain a valid grand subpoena for IP addresses and bank records.29
I don't mean to endorse the New Jersey Court's approach as a normative
matter. But if a future U.S. Supreme Court were to want to justify
Slobogin's results, the method chosen by the New Jersey Supreme Court
offers a more direct and simple path. It resembles Slobogin's method at a
high level of generality: Like Slobogin's, it regulates what needs to be regu-
lated and does so with as much privacy protection as needed but no more.
22. State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d 866 (N.J. 2005).
23. State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. 1982).
24. State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26 (N.J. 2008).
25. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 18, at 570-71 (detailing the dissenting arguments in the Su-
preme Court's transactional surveillance cases).
26. Reid, 945 A.2d at 35.
27. Id.
28. State v. McAllister, 875 A.2d 866, 875 (N.J. 2005).
29. See Reid, 945 A.2d at 36-37; McAllister, 875 A.2d at 875.
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But unlike Slobogin's approach, it does not require public opinion surveys
that courts are ill suited to apply and interpret.
CONCLUSION
In a revealing passage in Privacy at Risk, Slobogin acknowledges that
his objections to existing doctrine lie not in the goals of current law but
rather in the weighing of interests by recent Justices. "My quarrel with cur-
rent [Fourth Amendment] law is not with the general approach," he writes,
"but with the order and substance" of the specific legal rules that the recent
Court has produced (p. 180). The modem Court simply has not valued pri-
vacy enough (p. 4). Thus Professor Slobogin's goals are largely results
oriented: He aims to "prod"' courts to "closely watch[]" government sur-
veillance and subject it to more "meaningful regulation" (p. 4).
But if these are Slobogin's goals, his new conceptual framework goes
too far. Privacy at Risk would do more than simply increase privacy protec-
tions: It offers a truly new and original approach to the Fourth Amendment
with far-reaching implications. Perhaps a future Court might disagree with
the details of existing doctrine. Perhaps that Court might strike a different
balance between privacy and security more along Slobogin's preferences.
But if so, that Court should proceed cautiously: It should tweak the law, not
rework it from first principles. The existing framework of Fourth Amend-
ment protection already offers a more accurate framework to balance
privacy and security and is more sensitive to institutional abilities than the
new Fourth Amendment that Slobogin proposes. In my view, we are better
off with the Fourth Amendment we have now.
30. Univ. of Chi. Press, Christopher Slobogin: Privacy at Risk: Synopsis, http:I/
www.press.uchicago.edu/presssite/metadata.epl?mode=synopsis&bookkey=236643 (last visited
Oct. 20, 2008).
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